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Pennsylvania Case Law
Illustrating
the Elements of Medical Malpractice.
[Superior - 12/09/99] Consider this one a primer on medical battery, and when expert testimony is required. "[1] Whether [Appellants'] testimony can go to the jury without expert medical testimony that the unwanted surgery performed by [Appellee Sehgal] (the insertion of the inflatable penile prosthesis) caused the physical and mental symptoms of which [Appellants] complain[.] ; [2] Where [Appellant] suffers an objective, measurable, observable physical injury, are [Appellants] competent to testify as to the resulting physical, mental and emotional pain and suffering arising from the injury?" [Superior - 12/08/99] "This is an appeal from the trial court's order entering summary judgment in favor of defendant/appellee Clarion Hospital ("hospital"). The trial court treated this case as if it were a traditional medical malpractice case and required appellants to provide a medical expert who would opine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that hospital's acts deviated from an acceptable medical standard and that such deviation was the proximate cause of appellant Sybil Matthews' harm. When appellants failed to provide an expert report on the issue of causation in a timely fashion, the court entered summary judgment. We find, however, that this is a case of corporate negligence, not medical malpractice. " [Superior - 11/17/99] Tubal ligation in January; pregnancy the following August. Lawsuit = breach of express oral "Best judgment" rule versus "two schools of thought" doctrine. [Superior - 08/02/99] Tubal ligation in January; pregnancy the following August. Lawsuit = breach of express oral contract. POs & Motion for J/pleadings premised upon Health Care Services Malpractice Act (HCSMA), 40 P.S. § 1301.606. "Appellant first contends that the HCSMA is inapplicable because it is limited to actions involving the negligent delivery of medical services. . . . Appellant next asserts that section 1301.606 is inapplicable because it only pertains to a "cure" rather than a "result" of treatment. . . .Appellant further asserts in her brief that a written contract existed by virtue of the written consent form that she signed. . . . The remaining issues involve the question of whether Appellant may assert an action for breach of contract under existing caselaw, notwithstanding the provisions of the HCMSA." [Superior - 07/23/99] when is the cause of an injury so obvious as to preclude the necessity of an expert [Superior - 05/18/99] "This appeal follows a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case in which Appellants alleged that Appellees failed to timely diagnose and treat their infant daughter's congenital heart condition which led to her death. Upon review we find it necessary to award a new trial based upon Appellants' claims that Dr. Beerman, a treating physician, communicated with defense counsel ex parte and testified as a defense expert on liability without Appellants' consent in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 4003.6." [Superior - 03/19/99] Medmal/breach of contract action; judgment on the pleadings, asserting that plaintiffs' theories of recovery were barred by § 606 of the HCSMA, entered for Doc. Affirmed. Issues addressed = constitutionality of § 606 and whether that section precludes the action. "The gist of appellants' second argument is that the alleged contract between Mr. Flora and appellee was not for a "cure" but rather for a specific result from treatment and, as such, does not fall within the provisions of § 606." [Supreme - 02/26/99] "We granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine when conduct constitutes the rendering of professional health care services." [Commonwealth - 02/17/99] NOT medmal, but issue = aggravation of a pre-existing injury, w/i context of Board's reversal of WCJ's denial of claim petition. [Superior - 01/14/99] Job applicant, who had been offered a job, was subsequently denied job per positive drug test; he sues those hired by the employer to do the testing, alleging negligence. SJ granted below. "Based upon the facts of this case, we are not willing to create a theory of liability for negligent doctors or medical laboratories that have contracted with third parties for employment-related testing" [Superior - 01/11/99] Discussion re: doctor as fact vs expert witness, within content of rebuttal testimony and scope of pre-trial report. [Supreme - 12/24/98] Does ERISA pre-empt state tort claims? No! [Supreme - 11/25/1998] "We granted allocatur limited to the issues of one, whether a mental health professional has a duty to warn a third party of a patient's threat to harm the third party; two, if there is a duty to warn, the scope thereof; and finally, whether in this case a judgment on the pleadings was proper." [Superior - 10/28/1998] Medmal. Issues include: � two schools of thought doctrine � fair scope of expert's report � admissibility of nurse's letters � cross of expert Affirmed. [Superior - 10/15/98] Jury trial/ Graves disease [eyes]/ multiple surgeries. ". . . appellees' counsel's argument was clearly improper, as it conveyed to the jury something that counsel knew to be untrue" [curative instruction held insufficient]. Denial of new trial request reversed. [Superior - 10/06/98] "Appellant presents the following claims for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting Dr. Borah's motion for summary judgment; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial when the court requested to speak off the record with a defense expert; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to disqualify a defense expert, Dr. Warren Grover; and (4) whether the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Peter Berman to offer opinion testimony." [Superior - 10/05/98] "This appeal concerns the Shannons' claims of vicarious and corporate liability against HealthAmerica stemming from the premature delivery and subsequent death of their son. We reverse the order refusing to remove the compulsory nonsuit and remand for trial." [Superior - 09/22/98] Premature birth--respiratory distress--later diagnosed as severe retardation. Issues = Frye admissibility standard, and trial court's decision reflecting a ruling on the relative credibility of the parties' experts in violation of the doctrine set forth in Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. [Supreme - 09/11/98] Issues include liability of one physician for surgery performed by another & whether expert testimony required to prove causation. [Supreme - 07/23/98] Issue = whether a defendant must present medical literature to justify a "two schools of thought" instruction [Superior - 04/13/98] Issue [first impression] = "whether a psychiatrist who treats a child for alleged sexual abuse owes a duty of care to the parents of that child where the psychiatrist negligently diagnoses and treats the child and then, based on that misdiagnosis, subsequently embarks upon a course of action that directly affects both the child and the parents, as the alleged abusers" [Commonwealth - 01/27/98] Issue = "whether a physician may be disciplined by the State Board of Medicine (Board) for revealing allegedly confidential patient records during the course of litigation in which the physician is involved or whether the doctrine of judicial (litigation) immunity protects the physician from disciplinary proceedings before the Board" [Superior - 12/31/97] correct measure of compensatory damages: the amount billed by the hospital, or the amount received by the hospital as payment in full?; collateral source rule [Superior - 12/29/97] Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals = the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin. While pregnant with Jeffrey, Joan Blum took Bendectin, which was prescribed by her doctor to relieve pregnancy-related nausea. Jury verdict in favor of the Blums, finding specifically that his mother's ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy caused Jeffrey Blum's clubfeet. However, the verdict was ultimately vacated because it was rendered by only eleven jurors. Remand for new trial yielded jury award of $4M in compensatory damages to Jeffrey Blum, $200,000 in compensatory damages to his parents, and $15M in punitive damages. This = appeal from denial of Jnov motion. Thorough discussion of Frye and Pa.'s Topa cases; bottom-line = failure of plaintiff's experts to meet the Frye test yields reversal of trial judge's decision denying j.n.o.v., and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter that judgment in favor of Merrell Dow. [Superior - 12/08/97] � fair scope of expert's report � cross of medical expert re: defense counsel's representation in another pending medmal case � defendant physician testifying as fact witness [Supreme - 09/18/97]legal implications of plaintiff-patient's failure to attend post-operative appointments, in a negligent after-care case [Supreme - 07/23/97] res ipsa loquitur [thyroidectomy; thereafter, extreme hoarseness per paralyzed laryngeal nerve (one of 2 constituting vocal cords)] [Supreme - 07/23/97] corporate negligence [Supreme - 02/27/97] � substandard nursing care � competency of nurse to testify re: diagnosis � Professional Nursing Law [63 P.S. §§ 211 et seq.] [Supreme - 11/22/96] MDA and state pre-emption. [Among causes of action = failure to obtain informed consent.]
Informed Consent[Superior - 08/02/99]"The sole issue presented for our determination is whether a dentist must obtain the informed consent of his patient prior to performing a root canal. Instantly, the trial court determined as a matter of law that the doctrine of informed consent was inapplicable. We disagree." [Superior - 01/11/99] "We hold that the validity of a surgical patient's informed consent depends upon the pretreatment information relayed to the patient, regardless of whether the disclosures are made by the treating physician or another qualified person such as a nurse or other assistant." [Superior - 12/18/98] 16 year-old, rushed to Einstein's emergency ward, is diagnosed with pneumonia. Subsequently admitted, she underwent a cathertization procedure, during which she died. Trial revealed parents had given permission to one surgeon to perform the procedure, due to his extensive experience [Swan-Ganz catheter]; another surgeon performed procedure. Intubation via endotracheal tube was initially misplaced into patient's right main stem bronchus; later correctly repositioned, but questions as to when--- alleged as contributing factor of death. Trial court entered DV on lack of consent and punitive damages, the latter b/c of accompanying intentional infliction of e.d. claim [judge felt allowing both would constitute, effectively, double punies]; Superior Court vacates and remands for new trial. Dissent takes issue with Majority's allowance of intentional infliction of e.d. claim. [Superior - 07/29/98] Appeal from denial of motion for leave to amend. Quashed as interlocutory. "In the instant case, appellants sought to amend their complaint in medical malpractice to add a claim for lack of informed consent. This proposed additional claim is not distinct and separate from the main cause of action already in progress. To the contrary, the proposed amendment is directly related to appellants' main cause of action as an alternative theory of recovery. Thus, the order denying appellants leave to amend their complaint to add an alternative theory of recovery does not satisfy the first prerequisite of a collateral order." [Supreme - 12/29/97] Issue = whether the doctrine of informed consent should be expanded to include the non-surgical administration of medication where the claimed injury results from the method and location of administration of the medication rather than the medication itself. ... "we find that the doctrine of informed consent applies only to surgical procedures." ccollated by: http://www.dpg-law.com/opinions/By_Subject/medmal.shtml |
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